On the brighter side, she is said to be as intelligent as him hence it's no surprise that she'd grant him a plain yet fitting nickname. Even in adulthood, Reid hasn't escaped labels as he has been granted nicknames such as Sir Percival and Junior G-man by his colleagues.
The plates could also be a recurring filming mistake. In Season 10, he gets a new car with the Virginia license plate though it's never suggested that he has moved houses. It takes a while for him to recover and this is all tied to real life. Actor Matthew Gray Gubler actually got a knee injury that required 3 surgeries. He was thus forced to walk with a cane. Instead of halting filming, the writers decided to include a knew injury storyline for Reid.
This marks one of the many times that TV shows have included real-life developments such as pregnancies into the storylines. Spencer Reid might appear nerdy and innocent but he is actually responsible for the deaths of 8 unsubs during his time on the series.
Reid's intentional killing spree is one of the ways Criminal Minds changes throughout the seasons. His job description doesn't require him to constantly fight criminals like some of the other agents in the BAU. He is almost as comfortable as Penelope Garcia but given the dangerous nature of his work, he has found himself facing off against them on a few occasions.
Most of the lives he has taken have been due to self-defense. However, just a few episodes later "Cradle To The Grave" , he has an email address. Normally, inconsistencies occur over several seasons since the writers themselves can forget little details from past seasons. However, this one happens rather quickly, making it all the odder. It's never mentioned that Reid stopped being a technophobe and decided to open an email address after encountering Johnson so it's right to conclude that it's indeed a character inconsistency.
Philip Etemesi is an author, journalist, screenwriter and film critic based in Nairobi. As a child, he preferred watching movies like The Goodfellas instead of Home Alone. There is a reason behind that perceived chemistry: in real life, Matthew Gray Gubler and Paget Brewster the actress who plays Emily Prentiss are actually best friends. Gubler and Brewster are frequently seen hanging out on set, as well as off set, and the two are often at one another's houses, just hanging out. Personally, I am insanely jelly of that friendship on both sides.
Like, how cool would it be to get to work every single day with your best friend? Apparently, Gubler actually introduced Brewster to the man she would eventually marry. Brewster and Damstra totally hit it off, eventually fell in love, and then decided to get married. When they got engaged, they actually asked Matthew Gray Gubler to be the officiant at their wedding, which he accepted. In October of , he actually got himself officially ordained as a minister , and married Brewster and Damstra a little over a month later.
Talk about a serious bond of friendship, and I right? Yet another thing that Matthew Gray Gubler has in common with Dr. Spencer Reid and this time, unfortunately is the fact that he was bullied as a kid. He is adamant that though bullying was unpleasant at the time, it ultimately made him stronger, and totally unabashed about loving what he loves. I encourage you to do the same. Everyone who ever told me I was a weirdo or a looser or not good at anything, because that, for whatever reason Inspired a fire inside me, that propelled me to be [where I am.
Despite this positive attitude, Matthew Gray Gubler specifically does not like to be called Matt, and instead prefers his full first name, Matthew, because he associates the nickname Matt with the people who used to bully him back in the day. The real kicker is all the stuff in his varied collection of household items: homemade stuffed animals, a specially appointed closet for his many silk kimonos, random antique shotguns stashed everywhere, and abandoned Bop Its.
He tends to do interviews, like the one he did with Vanity Fair, in a floor length brown otter fur coat, that was once owned by Edward Gorey. Honestly, that sounds like the coolest guy in the world to me.
Though we know him primarily for his work in front of the camera, he has accomplished quite a bit behind the camera, as well. When it was established that Criminal Minds actress Paget Brewster, who plays Agent Emily Prentiss, would be leaving the show, she specifically requested that Matthew Gray Gubler direct her last episode. He also directed a series of mockumentaries called Matthew Gray Gubler: The Unauthorized Documentary , which parodies the many ridiculous things about Hollywood types.
And yes, he films on the set of Criminal Minds. In addition to both acting and directing, Matthew Gray Gubler also has another significant artistic gift. MGG is a talented painter, and a successful one to boot. In terms of mediums, he generally tends to use watercolor, gouache, oil, and pastel. Such preservation does not itself constitute an additional apprehension over and above the apprehension preserved. Indeed, according to Reid, it is impossible to currently apprehend any events in the past; apprehension is confined to perceiving present objects or being conscious of present mental operations Essays , 23, Reid does not deny that memory is itself a current mental state, nor does he deny that memory presupposes a past apprehension.
He denies only that memory is a current apprehension, and that the object of a memory is a past apprehension Essays , Memory preserves past apprehension by conceiving of an event previously apprehended and believing, of this event, that it happened to me. Reid holds that memory, like perception, is immediate. Neither the conception nor the belief that are the ingredients of memory are formed on the basis of reasoning or testimony.
In order to infer to a past event, one must have some prior, non-inferential relation to the event if it is to be a memory rather than a belief or knowledge. But then this prior, non-inferential relation would be an episodic memory. In addition, if episodic memory involved an inference to the effect that the event happened to me, the inference would be otiose because, as Reid claims, such a belief is already an immediate, non-inferential component of episodic memory.
In principle, one could infer from the conception and belief that are ingredients in memory to a further belief that the event happened. But if such a belief plays a role in preserving past apprehension then it is superfluous—such a belief, subject to the Previous Awareness Condition, is already embedded in episodic memory.
If the belief does not play a role in preserving past apprehension then it is a semantic memory, which, according to Reid, is among the species of belief or knowledge rather memory.
The distinction between beliefs that are ingredients in episodic memories and beliefs that are based on, but not ingredients in, episodic memories allows Reid to account for cases in which a memorial experience continues to represent an event as having happened, even when the person who seems to remember the event has what she regards as an overriding reason to believe that the event did not occur. The belief that is an ingredient in the experience represents the event as having happened to the person who seems to remember it.
Further, the belief will continue to represent the event as having happened to the person, even under conditions in which she forms a separate belief, not embedded in the memorial experience, to the effect that it did not happen to her.
The distinction also allows Reid to satisfy a constraint on any adequate theory of memory; namely, that it explain why memory represents events as having the special quality of being in the past. If belief were not an ingredient in episodic memory, then though we might believe that the events we remember are in the past, memory could not represent events as past.
If belief were not an ingredient in memory, then memory alone would relate us to an event previously apprehended. But the apprehension preserved is an apprehension of an event that was, at that time, represented in that apprehension as present. The pastness of the event apprehended is not part of the content of the past apprehension. But because a belief that the event happened to me is embedded in the memory itself, memory represents not merely past events, but past events as having occurred.
In other words, the belief that is partly constitutive of episodic memory is tensed. Does Reid appeal to the storehouse metaphor when he claims that memory is preserved past apprehension? Reid criticizes Locke and Hume for begging the question. Yet by holding that memory is in part constituted by a belief, does Reid not also assume the very phenomenon to be explained?
Reid can avoid the criticisms to which the theory of ideas is vulnerable by insisting that memory is not a current apprehension, but rather a preserved past apprehension.
His theory of memory is a direct realist theory because, according to Reid, memory is not directed towards any present perceptions, ideas, or impressions—stored or otherwise. Neither is memory directed towards any past perceptions, ideas, or impressions—stored or otherwise. Memory is directed towards the events presented in past apprehensions. Because apprehensions, perceptions, ideas, and impressions are never the objects of memory, they do not need to be stored for use by memory.
Likewise, the belief that is an ingredient in memory is not about any present or past apprehensions. It is a direct realist theory of memory because it departs from the model on which memory is a current apprehension of a past event or a current apprehension of a past apprehension.
On the direct realist view, memory preserves past apprehension of an event through conception and belief. Reid, Locke and others are interested in the notion of episodic memory not only for its own sake, but also because of its conceptual connection to the notion of personal identity. If Joe remembers, episodically, winning the World Series, then Joe must have existed at the time of his winning the World Series.
This is why the Previous Awareness Condition characterizes episodic but not semantic memory. In other words, episodic memory is logically sufficient for personal identity: if S remembers at time t n episodically an event at time t 1 , then S existed at time t 1. In addition, memory reports are often taken to be prima facie evidence for statements about the past history of the person reporting.
Reid interprets Locke as holding what is now called the Memory Theory of personal identity Essays , On this theory, personal identity consists in memory; sameness of episodic memory is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of persons. In other words, on the Memory Theory, what makes a person identical with herself over time is her remembering or being able to remember the events to which she was witness or agent.
If she cannot episodically remember an event, then she is not identical with any of the persons who was witness or agent to the event. In such a case, she would bear the same relation to that event as any other person for whom a memory of the event could rise at best to the level of a semantic memory.
If she can episodically remember an event, then her recollection or ability to recall that event makes her identical with the person represented in that memory as agent or witness to the event.
But there is a secondary, more subtle line of disagreement between Reid and Locke. By contrast, Reid holds that the self is a simple, unanalyzable immaterial substance with active powers. Reid argues that Locke cannot sustain both the thesis that the self is not a substance and the thesis that self remains identical over time. While Locke argues that the identity conditions for different kinds of things differ, so that the conditions under which a mass of matter, and an animal, and a person are not the same, Reid holds that identity is confined solely to substances that have a continued, uninterrupted existence and which do not have parts.
In other words, according to Reid, strictly speaking the only real identity is personal identity Essays , — Reid is friendly to this characterization of the self. At the same time, Locke appears to be committed to an analysis of personal identity in terms of memory, or, as Locke would put it, consciousness of the past.
Reid notes that Locke is aware of some of the consequences of the Memory Theory: if sameness of consciousness or memory is necessary and sufficient for sameness of person, then it is possible for there to be sameness of person without sameness of thinking Being. Which however reasonable, or unreasonable, concerns not personal Identity at all. Given that Reid thinks that this initial characterization is correct, he regards this as a reductio of the Memory Theory. According to the Memory Theory, personal identity consists in memory; that is, sameness of memory is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of person.
On this account, given that sameness of memory is sufficient for sameness of person, if a person at time t n remembers episodically an event that occurred at time t 1 then the person at time t n is identical with the person who was witness or agent to the event at time t 1. If the brave officer who has just taken the flag of the enemy remembers being beaten at school, then the brave officer is identical with the boy who was beaten.
If the general is identical with the brave officer, and the brave officer is identical with the boy, then by the transitivity of identity, the general is identical with the boy. However, on this account, given that sameness of memory is a necessary condition for sameness of person, if a person at time t n does not remember episodically an event that occurred at time t 1 , then the person at time t n cannot be identical with any person who was witness or agent to the event at time t 1.
If the general cannot remember being beaten at school, he cannot be identical with the boy who was beaten. Thus, the Memory Theory is committed to mutually incompatible theses: that the General is identical with the boy and that he is not. Consciousness and memory are distinct phenomena, according to Reid. The former is directed towards present mental acts and operations, while the latter is directed towards past events to which one was agent or witness.
If consciousness could extend to past events, then memory would be redundant Essays , According to Reid, memory is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity, metaphysically speaking, despite the conceptual and evidential relations memory bears to personal identity.
It is not a necessary condition because each us has been agent or witness to many events that we do not now remember. It is not a sufficient condition, for, as Butler showed, while having an episodic memory of an event entails that one existed at the time of the event remembered, it is not the recollection or the ability to recall that makes one identical with the person who was witness or agent to the event. Reid and Locke agree that memory, consciousness, thought, and other mental operations have no continued existence.
They are fleeting and non-continuous. But they also agree that identity, and in particular personal identity, requires a continued existence over time. But these commitments are jointly inconsistent with the thesis that personal identity consists in memory. A theory of personal identity is intended to account for how a person remains identical over time. When analyzed in terms of items that are fleeting and non-continuous—ideas, memories, thoughts—identity is reduced to diversity; that is, it is eliminated.
By contrast, if one locates personal identity in that which thinks and remembers, and which has a continued, uninterrupted existence, one purchases personal identity at the cost of admitting that the self is a substance. Reid captures Locke on the horns of a dilemma: either the self is a substance, in which case it remains identical over time, or the self is not a substance, in which case there is no personal identity.
Rather, Reid argues that the nature of personal identity—its simplicity and indivisibility—rules out any reductive account that appeals to notions other than identity in explaining how a person persists over time. Reid holds that numerical identity is, strictly speaking, indefinable, but it can be contrasted with other relations, such as diversity, similarity and dissimilarity Essays , It requires a continued existence over time—a duration—and requires that there be no two beginnings of existence.
Because mental states are fleeting and non-continuous they cannot remain identical over time.
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